We study the effect of government ideology on sustainable development, measured as investment in genuine wealth, in a dynamic panel of 79 countries between 1981 and 2013.
Introduction
The macro development literature provides many important insights into the process of economic development, understood as growth in GDP per capita, and it points to political and legal institutions, human capital and natural resource endowments as some of the fundamental causal factors. While sustained growth in GDP per capita without doubt is important, it is recognized widely that economic growth needs not go hand in hand with sustainable development understood as expansion in the stocks of wealth required to sustain high levels of human wellbeing (Arrow et al. 2003) . Understanding the determinants of sustainable development, as a consequence, becomes a top priority to move the macro development literature forward and we argue that a public choice perspective can offer new insights. In particular, the purpose of this paper is to study the effect of government ideology on sustainable development and to ask whether governmental turnover creates partisan cycles as well as to explore whether elections themselves induce opportunistic political cycles in genuine investment.
The value of doing that is two-fold. First, in the face of important social challenges, ranging from climate change to aging populations, the question of sustainable development has become a top priority for many observers and policy-makers (Arrow et al., 2004) . Sustainability is closely related to investment in a society's capital stocks broadly conceived to include manufactured, human and natural capital 1 , referred to as genuine wealth. A country that is running down its genuine wealth is on an unsustainable development path and will experience falling welfare levels even if in the short-term its GDP per capita is rising. More precisely, the intertemporal social welfare of a society is increasing if and only if net investment in its genuine wealth is positive (Dasgupta and 1 Natural capital refers to physical stocks of renewable and non-renewable resources and to the physical receptor systems that can assimilate pollution (e.g., the seas and the atmosphere).
Mäler 2000; Arrow et al. 2003) . Since these genuine investments can, in principle, be measured (Atkinson and Hamilton 2003; World Bank 2006) , it is possible to study empirically the determinants of sustainable development and doing so is of first-order importance (Dasgupta 2010).
Second, sustainability intrinsically is linked to issues of governance. As noted, sustainable development requires investment in society's capital assets and decisions on these investments are the outcomes of a political process as well as market processes.
Aspects of this nexus have been investigated previously. Aidt (2009 Aidt ( , 2011 , for example,
shows that corruption has a robust negative effect on sustainable development, while legal institutions that govern the way disputes are settled make little difference. Venard (2013) investigates the impact of political institutions and corruption on sustainable development and shows, in a cross-country analysis, that institutional quality affects growth in genuine wealth both directly and indirectly by reducing corruption. We add to this literature by studying whether short-term fluctuations in government ideology (measured on a left-right scale) induce fluctuations in genuine investment. This is an important endeavor because it
helps us understand what causes variations in these investments within a set of countries with basic democratic institutions (regular elections). It is also important because political polarization is on the rise in many countries and, thus, if government ideology plays a role in whether a country is on (or stays on) a sustainable path, that trend might magnify the effect of politics on sustainability.
Specifically, we use a panel of 79 countries between 1981 and 2013 to study the relationship between government ideology and growth in genuine investment. We find that right-wing governments are associated with improvements in genuine investment while genuine wealth tends to deteriorate under left-wing governments. Our result is new to the literature and remarkably robust. 4 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an introduction to the theory underlying the use of genuine investment as an index of sustainable development and develops hypotheses linking investment in genuine wealth to government ideology and the partisan cycle. Section 3 presents the data and the econometric approach. Section 4 reports the main results related to government ideology and genuine investment. Section 5 considers the issue of endogeneity. Section 6
investigates the interplay between the time a party has been in power, government ideology and genuine investment. Section 7 offers a broader discussion of the results and concludes. The online supplementary material includes an appendix with tables reporting robustness checks and the Stata code and data to replicate the results in the main text.
Theoretical background and hypotheses
The World Commission (1997) loosely defines sustainable development as a current economic path that does not compromise the well-being of future generations. Arrow et al. (2004) propose a more precise definition, which we adopt for the purpose of our study. . That is a step in the right direction, but as pointed out many years ago by Hicks (1940) , if a nation's wealth is to increase, the social value of consumption must not exceed NNP. The implication is that it is possible for NNP to grow while, at the same time, a nation's wealth is run down. Third, the United Nations Development Program promotes the HDI as an indicator of the quality of life. The index is constructed by measuring a nation's average performance gap -the normalized difference between the nation's performance on a given indicator and best practice. 4 The key constituents of the HDI are life expectancy at birth, GNP per capita, expected years of schooling and adult literacy. As pointed out by Dasgupta (2001, pp. 80-82) , the fundamental problem with the HDI as a measure of sustainable development, besides the fact that it inherits the unsatisfactory features of GNP per capita, is that life expectancy 3 One consequence of the intertemporal emphasis is that tradeoffs are allowed, in the sense that social welfare may be lower at some future date than it is today so long as the discounted present value is not declining. See Arrow et al. (2004, p. 150) for further discussion of the implications of this definition. 4 Formally, let x ij be a particular indicator of "development" i in country j. Then the preformance gap for that indicator for that country is = produces an all-purpose good ( ) from labor ( ), manufactured capital ( ), and the flow of natural resources ( ). The production technology is represented as:
where F increases in each of the three arguments and is continuously differentiable. The production function need not be concave. As a consequence, the results regarding sustainable development, government ideology, and political business cycles apply to a wide class of economies with externalities and other market and government failures.
Manufactured capital evolves over time according to the following law of motion:
where is aggregate consumption, is investment in manufactured capital, and no depreciation (capital consumption) is assumed. The natural resource base ( ) evolves according to the following law of motion:
where ( ) is the natural rate of regeneration of the resource and can be interpreted as the net investment in the resource base. For non-renewable resources, the regeneration rate is zero for all , while for renewable resources it is positive. Individuals derive utility from consumption and disutility from labor supply, which are represented by a concave utility function, ( , ). Intertemporal social welfare at time t can, then, be defined by a utilitarian social welfare function:
where δ>0 is the (utility) discount rate. A development path starting at time τ is a projection into the future of all relevant economic quantities, i.e.,
The economy's institutions and the policy choices made under those institutions govern which development path actually is chosen at any given point in time. We make a distinction between the institutions that in a persistent way define the framework under which private and public decisions are made and day-to-day policy making which will be affected by the ideology of the ruling government (and other temporary factors).
Institutions are not presumed to be perfect. Economic institutions can be dysfunctional (distorted markets, unregulated monopolies, and so on) or not, rent seeking may be kept in check or not, and the legal system may be effective or not. For the purpose of our analysis, we do, however, assume that the underlying political institutions are democratic in the limited sense that elections in which the incumbent may lose power take place at regular intervals. We also assume that institutions are persistent. 5 For simplicity, the ideology of the ruling government is either right-wing or left-wing (we return to what this means below) and we assume that elections induce (random) alternations between the two parties. At any given point in time, the "ideological state" of the society is Λ t
where p is the probability that a left-wing party is in power at time t and 1-p is the probability that a right-wing party is in power. Society's institutions are defined formally as a function, α, that, given the state of the economy at each time t, { , } and the ideology of the ruling government selects a development path ( � ) from the set of feasible paths. We can then write intertemporal social welfare explicitly as a function of institutions, the ideology of the current government, and the stocks of capital: = ( , Λ , , ). As time unfolds, and power alternates between parties with different ideologies, the society jumps from one development path to another.
Given the framework above, we ask two key questions. Mäler (2000) prove two important equivalence results that provide the fuzzy concept of sustainability with real empirical content. 6 We shall focus on the most immediate of those results as it suffices for our present purpose. The social scarcity of the two capital assets can be measured by their accounting or shadow prices:
The shadow prices measure the change is intertemporal social welfare associated with a small increase in the relevant capital stock. Recall that intertemporal social welfare is a function of institutions, the ideological position of the ruling government and the capital stocks, i.e., = ( , Λ , ). Calculation of the total derivative gives:
Using the definitions of the accounting prices from above (equations (6) and (7)), along with equations (2) and (3), we can rewrite equation (8) as:
where GI is short-hand for genuine investment. Genuine investment reflects the change in society's genuine wealth (GW), i.e., ≡ . Genuine investment is linked to the change in intertemporal social welfare through equation (9), which provides the fundamental link between theory and empirical implementation. Equation (9) In democratic societies, the ideological position of the ruling government is likely to influence the scale, timing and composition of investments in the society's capital stocks.
Elections provide citizens with a mechanism for selecting new governments and, as a consequence, parties with different ideologies gain and lose control of government at election times. Our general hypothesis is that governmental change induces partisan cycles in genuine savings and that a society over time may move on and off a sustainable development path. The classical works by Hibbs (1977 Hibbs ( , 1987 We conjecture that the fiscal conservatism of right-wing parties and their greater willingness to deregulate the economy will positively influence investment into manufactured capital and concentrate public spending on provision of merit goods like education at the expense of welfare programs. The later effect is reinforced by the observation that right-wing parties are more willing to mobilize private funds to cofinance higher education (Kauder and Potrafke 2013) . With respect to natural capital, which is preserved or accumulated through farsighted exploration of natural resources and through environmental regulations, it is less clear if right-wing parties will support policies that preserve and build-up the stock of natural resource capital to larger or smaller extents than left-wing parties. Right-wing parties' general willingness to deregulate markets may, for example, spill over into a specific unwillingness to regulate externalities. However, whether the unintended consequences of opportunistic attempts to manipulate the macroeconomy are sufficiently strong to create a political business cycle in genuine investment must also be considered an open empirical question.
Data and econometric specification
To investigate the interplay between ideology, elections and genuine investment, we use an unbalanced panel dataset of 79 countries between 1981 and 2013. To be included in the sample, a country must have democratic elections over the relevant period.
The theoretical foundation for the opportunistic political business cycle was laid by Nordhaus (1975) and integrated into rational expectations models by Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990) The fourth adjustment also is environmentally motivated. It seeks to account for energy depletion, mineral depletion and net forest depletion by subtracting an estimate of the relevant resource rents from net national savings. 12 The result of these adjustments of gross national savings provides a rough estimate of genuine investment in terms of the percentage of gross national income (GNI). We follow Arrow et al. (2003) and convert those numbers into an estimate of growth in genuine wealth per capita (GWgrowth) by include countries (during periods) in which they had competitive elections and when multiple parties did win seats. A score of 6 indicates that the largest party received more than 75% of the seats, while a score of 7
indicates that it won less than that (in some robustness checks, we restrict the sample to those countries with a score of 7). The countries in our sample are listed in the note to Table 2 . It includes countries from Europe, the Americas, Africa, Oceania, the Middle East and Asia.
multiplying genuine investment as percentage of GNI by a presumed GNI-wealth ratio 13 and by subtracting the population growth rate from that product. Table 1 presents data on genuine investment from a selection of six countries and illustrates how they are calculated. We observe, in several cases, that countries with positive GDP per capita growth rates have at the same time experienced negative growth in genuine wealth per capita.
[Insert Table 1 around here]
Secondly, we need empirical measures of government ideology. Constructing indicators of government ideology is complicated by the fact that substantial differences exist in party and parliamentary systems across the countries in our sample and by the fact that coalition governments consisting of two or more parties with different ideologies can be coded in different ways. We use the classification (EXECRLC) proposed in the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) to characterize party ideology. 14 The DPI divides parties into three groups based on an evaluation of a party's stance on economic policy.
We define the corresponding indicator variables: Right, Left or Center. For single-party majority governments, the indictor variable corresponding to its ideology takes the value one in years during which the party rules a given country. For coalition governments, the DPI classifies a coalition government as having the ideology of the largest coalition partner. The group of right-wing parties includes conservative, Christian democratic and other right-wing parties; the group of left-wing parties includes communist, socialist, 13 In the baseline, we follow Arrow et al. (2004) and the ratios we use are 0.2 for industrialized countries and 0.15 for developing and oil-rich countries. We have investigated if the results are sensitive to this choice and party's ideology from the effect produced by time in office. In some specifications, we also include the Polity IV index, which captures the quality of political institutions, allowing us to isolate the short-to medium-term effect of government ideology on sustainability from the potential long-run effect of changes in underlying political institutions.
The theory underlying our use of genuine investment as an index of sustainability requires us to control for capital stocks and for the shadow prices associated with those stocks. Owing to the country-specific fixed effects, ν i, , the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error terms in equation (10) For that reason, we estimate equation (10) with an instrumental variables estimator that is appropriate when, as in our case, the number of cross-sectional units dominate the number of time periods (Arellano and Bond 1991). Specifically, we adopt the one-step generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator, which estimates equation (10) in first differences and uses the levels of the explanatory variables as instruments to avoid correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the country-specific effects. We show that our estimates are robust to using either the two-step estimator or the system GMM estimator.
16
A problem that we have to deal with is the "too many instruments problem" that can lead to over-fitting biases, i.e., even if individually valid, the instruments can be collectively invalid because they over-fit the endogenous variables (Doornik et al. 2002; Roodman 2009a, b) . To minimize the over-fitting problem, we use the collapse alternative suggested by Roodman (2009b) . The empirical results from our panel data analysis are presented and discussed in the next section. The online supplementary material reports on many robustness checks.
Main results
16 Although the two-step estimator is asymptotically more efficient than the one-step estimator and relaxes the assumption of homoscedasticity, the efficiency gains are not that important even in the case of heteroscedastic errors. That result is supported by Judson and Owen (1999) . They show empirically that the one-step estimator outperforms the two-step estimator, especially when the number of time periods is relatively large (T=30), which is the case in this study. Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundel and Bond (1998) suggest another GMM estimator with additional moment conditions. If the conditions are valid, efficiency will increase. The system GMM estimator combines the moment conditions of the model in first differences with those of the model in levels. However, if the orthogonality conditions for the firstdifferenced equation are valid, but those for the level equation are not, then the system GMM estimator may not be better than first-differences GMM estimator. That can happen, for example, if the regressors used in the orthogonality conditions for the levels equation are correlated with the individual effects. Moreover, simulations suggest that the system GMM estimator is not necessarily superior to the standard GMM estimator in cases for which the autoregressive parameter is below 0.8 and the time-series observations are relatively large (Blundell and Bond 1998; Moshirian and Wu 2012) . That is what we observe in our data. So, to sum up, the estimator that is most suitable for our empirical analysis is the one-step first-differences GMM estimator. (2), we observe that growth in genuine wealth is higher under right-wing governments than under either leftwing or centrist governments. In column (3), we report, for comparison, a specification estimated with a fixed effects estimator rather than with the difference-GMM estimator.
We observe that the point estimate on Right is smaller than the GMM estimate reported in column (2), but statistically significant at the 1% level. The estimate of the persistence parameter is much larger, as one would expect in the presence of Nickell's bias.
The positive effect of right-wing parties on GWgrowth is not just statistically significant, it also is of economic importance. The average growth rate of genuine wealth per capita is 0.62 with a standard deviation of 1.8 (see Table 2 ). Accordingly, based on the estimate from Table 3, Table A6 in the supplementary material reports the results from a system-GMM estimator. The results are similar to those shown in Table 3. markets, 18 and their focus on provision of merit goods pay off in terms of investments in the fundamental capital stocks and, moreover, that that difference is sufficient to compensate for any under-investment in natural capital.
[Insert Table 3 around here]
In contrast to the robust evidence on the partisan cycle, the timing of elections by itself does not appear to affect the growth rate of genuine wealth. The point estimate on Election year never is statistically different from zero, rejecting the idea of an opportunistic election cycle in genuine investment. 19 That finding is not entirely surprising. After all, it takes time to enact policies with substantive effects on genuine investment and, on top of that, it is hard for voters to observe and attribute short-term fluctuations in such investments to government policy. An implication, then, is that it is not elections per se that create cycles in genuine investment. Rather the cycles are created by underlying ideological differences with regard to economic policy that filter through to investments in genuine wealth.
The partisan cycles in genuine investment are short-to medium-run phenomena that can cause a country to move on or off a sustainable path. In contrast, the nature of the 18 That conjecture is substantiated by the fact that the correlation between the Fraser Institute's Economic
Freedom Index and the right-wing government indicator is positive (0.11) and significant at the 1% level.
Moreover, the correlation between the right-wing government indicator and the regulation sub-component of the Freedom House index (capturing credit, labor and business regulations) is negative (-0.14) and also significant at the 1% level. 19 In additional experiments, reported in Table A1 in the supplementary material , we investigate the existence of cycles in elections that result in a change in the political orientation of the government, if differences are observed in pre-and post-election years, or if it matters how long the interval between elections is. Apart from a weak positive effect of elections that result in a change in government ideology, we find no evidence of an election cycle. Yet, the many important differences in party systems that clearly exist make it, as previously noted, a challenge to measure differences in government ideology consistently across time and space. One way to engage that challenge is to investigate potential heterogeneity across subsamples of countries with broadly similar party systems. In Table   20 Specifically, we consider the democratization index proposed by Acemoglu et al. (2018) Tables A3 and A4 in the supplementary material. Very occasionally one of the institutional controls is significant, but in no case does it have more than a small effect on the size and significance of the estimated effect of right-wing government ideology. 21 We have investigated if the effect of right-wing government ideology on sustainable development is conditional on the general quality of political institutions, on the regime type or on the election rule. We cannot find any evidence that it is contigent on the general quality of political institutions (results available upon request). Tables A3 and A4 in the supplementary material report that the effect is larger in plurality regimes and in countries with proportional election rules.
3, columns (5) and (6), we report specifications that split the overall sample into an OECD and a non-OECD sample. We observe a strong partisan cycle in both samples, but the point estimate on Right is larger for the sample of non-OECD countries. 22 The larger amplitude of the cycle outside the OECD democracies is likely explained by larger differences in the ideological stances of left-and right-wing governments with regard to economic policy in non-OECD democracies. 23 The main specification in equation (10) controls for country and time fixed effects and thus estimates the effect of government ideology from within country and year variations. In Table 3 , column (7), we ask if the results are robust to controlling for continent-specific time trends. Those trends pick up regional movement of populism, the effect of the 1980s' debt crisis, and other timevarying and continent-specific heterogeneity. We see that the point estimate on Right is hardly affected by that re-specification.
We have, by splitting the sample, investigated if the relationship between government ideology and genuine investment was different during and after the cold war. Table A6 , columns (1) and (2) in the supplementary material show that the answer is no:
the positive impact of right-wing government ideology holds during and after the cold war. In addition, we have experimented with different time aggregations of the data. In the baseline specification, the data frequency is annual. We think this is the right frequency for a study of partisan and election cycles. However, in the macro development and growth literature, the data commonly are time averaged into five-or even ten-year periods.
That is done to eliminate short-run fluctuations. To establish the robustness of our baseline 22 While in the group of OECD countries the growth rate of genuine wealth per capita is, on average, 0.13 percentage points higher when a right-wing party is in office, in the non-OECD countries it is 0.24 percentage points higher, ceteris paribus.
23 Besides dividing the sample between the OECD and non-OECD countries, we also investigated alternative sample splits. Those results, reported in Tables A3, A4 and A5 in the supplementary material,
show that right-wing parties affect investment in genuine wealth in presidential, plurality and proportional representation regimes and are observed in both high-and low-income countries/democracies.
results to the choice of the temporal unit, Table A6 , columns (10) and (11) in the supplementary material report two specifications with five-year averages. As such, we recode Right as the fraction of each five-year period that a country was governed by a right-wing party and we replace Election Year with the variable Gov. changes, which records the number of changes of government within each five-year period. We note that the fraction of years under right-wing rule is positively correlated with growth in genuine wealth, while the effect of frequent government changes is negatively related, but not significant.
Regarding the economic control variables, we observe from In summary, we have uncovered a partisan cycle in the growth rate of genuine wealth: right-wing parties are associated with faster growth in genuine wealth than leftwing parties. The result is robust, economically important and new to the literature.
Conceptually, we argue that it is important for the macro development literature to shift attention from a narrow focus on growth in GDP and to embrace a broader conception of sustainable development that reflects political effects of on social welfare. That is not just a matter of principle; it is also a matter of drawing the correct empirical inferences. The importance of the latter is illustrated by the fact that if we replace growth in genuine wealth with growth in GDP per capita in equation (10) and re-estimate, we find the opposite result, namely that right-wing governments are associated with slower economic (GDP) growth than left-wing parties (see Table A6 , column (9) in the supplementary material).
Endogeneity concerns
Government ideology is not randomly assigned to the governing party. One may, therefore, be concerned that ideology could be correlated with unobserved time-and country-specific determinants of genuine investment. Reverse causality is unlikely to be a major concern, so the question is if the ideology of the elected government and genuine 
Ideology and tenure in office
It takes time for a government to change the package of economic policies and for these policies to filter through to investments in genuine wealth. A long period in power generally is necessary for a government to fully implement its medium-term policies. The more time a government spends in office, the more scope it has for ensuring consistency across different dimensions of its economic and social policies. Frequent changes in government, on the other hand, tend to see such efforts interrupted or reversed. It is, 25 We use the Stata procedure PSACALC (Oster, 2017) to calculate the numbers. therefore, reasonable, on the one hand, to expect that the number of years that a government rules could have an independent effect on genuine investment and, on the other, that it may interact with the partisan cycle we identified above.
In all of the specifications reported in Table 3 , we entered the variable Party tenure to ask if time in office has an independent effect on GWgrowth. The answer there clearly was no. The point estimate on the variable is insignificant, with the one exception of a marginally significant and positive effect in the OECD sample (column (5)). It is, of course, possible that the impact of time in office is non-linear, reflecting the natural life cycles of governments. On the one hand, as already noted, more years in office enables a party to implement its policy agenda. On the other hand, the literature on vote and popularity functions documents that a government's popularity erodes the longer it is in office. 26 As this "cost of ruling" reduces a government's general popularity, it may switch to more populist policies. We may, therefore, observe a switch from medium-term policies that have a positive effect on genuine investment to short-term policies that have a negative effect as a government "ages" in office. Those considerations suggest that the relationship between time in office and investment in genuine wealth follows an inverted U-shaped relationship. Table 4 , column (1) reports a specification with Party tenure and its square. We see that both coefficients are insignificant and that the point estimate on the indicator variable Right is unaffected by that change. In columns (3) and (4), we investigate the effect of the years that the party leader (rather than the party itself) has been in power. Again, we find no direct effect. Taken together, those findings reject the hypothesis that time in office exerts an independent (linear or non-linear) effect on genuine investment. It, however, does not rule out that time in office could interact with the partisan cycle in genuine investment. To test that hypothesis, we interact the indicator 26 See, for example, the seminal papers by Mueller (1970) and Veiga and Veiga (2004) .
variable for right-wing parties, Right, with Party tenure or with Leader tenure. Table 4, columns (2) and (5) report the results. We observe that the interaction terms are very far from being statistically significant and we conclude that the partisan cycle appears to be unaffected by length of tenure.
[Insert Table 4 around here]
Conclusions
The question of sustainable development increasingly has become important for policymakers in developing and developed countries. Climate change, aging populations and other important social and economic challenges have highlighted the importance of studying the subject. Sustainability is naturally linked to issues of governance in general and to policy decisions made by the governments in particular. Such policy decisions depend on government ideology and electoral concerns.
In this paper, we add to the substantial existing literature on the influence of government ideology and electoral politics on public policy by studying the effect of ideology on investment in an economy's capital stocks (its genuine wealth). We find strong evidence that the government's ideological color matters and that investment in genuine wealth rises when right-wing governments are in office. Economic conservatism attributed to right-wing parties and their greater willingness to deregulate the economy may be driving that effect. The results are robust. In contrast, our results clearly rule out the existence of opportunistic election cycles. The expansion/contraction cycle near elections (if it actually occurs) does not seem to affect genuine investment. Notes: The table illustrates how genuine investment as a percentage of GNI is constructed by making adjustments to gross savings. To obtain the growth rate of genuine wealth, we follow Arrow et al. (2003) and multiply genuine investment as percentage of GNI by the GNI-to-wealth ratios (0.2 for the USA and the UK and 0.15 for the rest) and subtract the annual population growth rate over the period 1996-2007. Damage from CO 2 emissions is based on a marginal cost of $30 per tonne.
Sources: Adopted from Aidt (2011) and based on World Development Indicators (several years). Table 2 for definitions of the variables. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; significance levels at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. Year fixed effects included in all estimations. The one-step difference-GMM estimator is employed, except in regression (3) where a FE estimator is used instead; the lag of the dependent variable is treated as endogenous in the GMM estimations; the respective lagged values and the other explanatory variables are used as instruments in the first-difference equation; the instrument set is collapsed to avoid the problem of having too many instruments. The Hansen J-test reports the p-value for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. The values reported for AR(1) and AR(2) are the p-values for first and second order auto-correlated disturbances in the first differences equations. Separate estimations for OECD and non-OECD countries are reported in columns (5) and (6), respectively. Three OECD countries are dropped in these estimations: Estonia (due to few observations and lack of variability), Iceland (very few observations for the dependent variable) and Switzerland (no variability in the ideology; always right-wing governments). In column (7), we add continent-specific time trends. Tables 1 to 4 in the main text. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; significance levels at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. Year fixed-effects are controlled for in all estimations. A one step difference-GMM estimator is employed in the estimations and the instruments are collapsed. Election Gov change is a dummy variable that takes the value of one when there are elections that result in the change of the political orientation of the government; 0 otherwise. Before Election is equal to one in the years before the elections; 0 otherwise. After Election is equal to one in the years after the elections; 0 otherwise. Election timing measures the passage of the time between election (it is equal to one in the election years). Election month accounts for the month of the election and it is computed as in Franzese (2000, pp 61-83) . Majority is a dummy variable that takes the value of one when the government has majority in the parliament; 0 otherwise. Coalition is a dummy variable that takes the value of one when the government is formed by a coalition of parties; 0 otherwise. Tables 1 to 4 in the paper. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; significance levels at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. Year fixed-effects are controlled for in all estimations. A one step difference-GMM estimator is employed in the estimations and the instruments are collapsed. GDPpc growth is the real GDP per capita growth rate. GDP growth is the real GDP growth rate. %Pop0-14 accounts for the percentage of population between 0 and 14 years old. %Pop65above accounts for the percentage of population with 65 years or more. Columns (5) and (6) report results considering different GNI wealth ratios in the construction of the dependent variable: in regression 5 (6), GWgrowth was computed considering 0.25 (0.15) for industrialized countries and 0.20 (0.10) for developing and oil-rich countries. Tables 1 to 4 in the paper. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; significance levels at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. Year fixed-effects are controlled for in all estimations. A one step difference-GMM estimator is employed in the estimations and the instruments are collapsed. Presid (NPresid) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in countries with presidential (non-presidential) regimes; 0 otherwise. Plural (NPlural) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in countries with plurality (non-plurality) regimes; 0 otherwise. A plurality vote (e.g., in North America) or a relative majority (e.g., in the United Kingdom) describe the circumstance when a candidate or proposition polls more votes than any other, but does not receive a majority. Tables 1 to 4 in the paper. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; significance levels at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. Year fixed-effects are controlled for in all estimations. A one step difference-GMM estimator is employed in the estimations and the instruments are collapsed. PropR (MajR) is a dummy variable that takes the value of one in countries with proportional (majority) representation systems; 0 otherwise. Institutional variables data comes from the International Country Risk Guide (see https://www.prsgroup.com/aboutus/our-two-methodologies/icrg). Tables 1 to 4 in the paper. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; significance levels at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. Year fixed-effects are controlled for in all estimations. A one step difference-GMM estimator is employed in the estimations and the instruments are collapsed. OECD (NOECD) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for OECD countries (non-OECD countries); 0 otherwise. HIC (NHIC) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for high-income countries (not high or low-income countries); 0 otherwise. 
Table2. Description of the variables and descriptive statistics

